Blue Prysm · Analysis7.6 km on paper · 1 km measured

Analysis · Integrated sensing · part 4 of 5

What survives the link budget

A phone’s signal weakens with the square of distance. A radar echo weakens with the fourth power. That one difference, more than any other, decides which sensing businesses a mobile network can run. Worked out on thermal noise alone, a C-band macro site could see a small drone several kilometres away; every measured result on the record stops at a kilometre or less. The gap between the two has causes specific enough to put numbers on, and we have put numbers on them.

Sources: 3GPP TR 38.765 V20.0.0, Annex A, clauses 6.3 and 9, and TR 38.901 V19.5.0, Tables 7.3-1 and 7.9.2.1-1 to 7.9.2.1-4; 47 CFR 27.50 and 30.202 as in force on 1 October 2026, and the upper C-band order as published at 91 FR 48700; Saur and others (Nokia Bell Labs), “Reliable UAV Detection with ISAC”, 22 May 2026, and Meng and others, BSense, 31 March 2026, both preprints; drone cross-sections from Ezuma, Funderburk and Guvenc (2019) and Semkin and others, IEEE Access (2020); radio powers as reported by SDxCentral and Sivers Semiconductors; China Mobile trial claims as reported by National Business Daily (27 May 2023), ZTE (30 January 2024) and Beijing Daily (21 May 2024); the AT&T and Ericsson release via Placera (10 July 2026) and RCR Wireless (4 August 2026). Read 7 Oct 2026.

A radar loses signal with the fourth power of distance

A phone receives a base station’s signal after one trip, so the power falls with the square of the distance. A radar receives its own signal back after two trips and a reflection in between, so the power falls with the fourth power. Everything that follows comes from that.

The difference compounds quickly. Doubling the distance costs a communications link 6 dB and a radar 12 dB, which is another way of saying that doubling a radar’s range takes sixteen times the energy on the target. Put one radio through both equations and the gap is plain (Exhibit 1). A 320 W radio behind a 26.1 dBi panel at 3.85 GHz delivers a phone 1 km away a signal of −23.0 dBm in free space. The echo it gets back from a small drone at the same distance is −80.8 dBm, about 58 dB weaker. A car, being a much bigger reflector, sends back −56.7 dBm.

Exhibit 1At 1 km the same radio gives a phone a signal about 58 dB stronger than the echo it gets back from a small drone

PhoneCar echoDrone echo

-100-75-50-250500 m1,000 m2,000 mPhone, 500 m: −17.0 dBmPhone, 1,000 m: −23.0 dBmPhone, 2,000 m: −29.1 dBmCar echo, 500 m: −44.7 dBmCar echo, 1,000 m: −56.7 dBmCar echo, 2,000 m: −68.8 dBmDrone echo, 500 m: −68.7 dBmDrone echo, 1,000 m: −80.8 dBmDrone echo, 2,000 m: −92.8 dBmPhone −29.1 dBmCar echo −68.8 dBmDrone echo −92.8 dBmReceived power, dBm

Source: free-space loss and the radar equation at 3.85 GHz, 320 W into 26.1 dBi, 81.1 dBm EIRP, under the FCC limit of 1,640 W/MHz (82.1 dBm in 100 MHz); radar cross-sections from TR 38.901 Table 7.9.2.1, small drone −12.8 dBsm and car +11.3 dBsm (Calculated). Note: phone antenna 0 dBi. The receiver’s noise in 100 MHz with a 5 dB noise figure is −89 dBm before integration gain.

Integration closes most of that gap, at least against noise. A 1 ms look across 100 MHz adds about 50 dB of processing gain, which is why the noise-only ranges below run to kilometres. What it cannot do is close the gap against anything that integrates along with the echo: the transmitter’s own leakage, reflections from buildings and the ground, and whatever else in the beam happens to be moving.

Every input to the calculation is on a public record

We have not had to assume much. Most of the inputs are 3GPP’s own evaluation assumptions, and the rest are the FCC’s power limits and two preprints (Exhibit 2).

Exhibit 2The FCC allows 82.1 dBm in 100 MHz, but 3GPP capped a listening base station at 37 or 52 dBm
InputValueSource
Power limit, C-band and 3.45 GHz, non-rural1,640 W/MHz EIRP per sector; 82.1 dBm in 100 MHz47 CFR 27.50(j)(2) and (k); upper C-band the same (FCC 26-46)
Power limit, millimetre wave75 dBm per 100 MHz; 81.0 dBm in 400 MHz47 CFR 30.202(a)
Radios in service200 W (Samsung, 2020); 320 W (Ericsson AIR 6419); 480 W (AIR 6494)Company releases and pages, reported
Power while listening37 dBm or 52 dBmTR 38.765 Annex A
Array gain8 dBi element; 26.1 dBi at n77, 32.1 dBi at 28 GHzTR 38.901 Table 7.3-1; TR 38.765 arrays
Noise figure5 dB (FR1), 7 dB (FR2)TR 38.765 Annex A
Cross-section, small drone−12.81 dBsm mean, spread 3.74 dBTR 38.901 Table 7.9.2.1-1
Cross-section, person; large drone; car−1.37 dBsm; −5.85 dBsm; +11.25 dBsmTR 38.901 Tables 7.9.2.1-1, -2 and -4
Drone cross-sections outside 3GPPDJI Phantom 4 Pro measured at −15.03 dBsm at 15 GHz and −12.40 at 25 GHz; DJI Air 3 assessed at about −17 dBsmEzuma and others, 2019; Nokia Bell Labs, 2026
Detection threshold17 dB; 13.1 dB for a steady target and 21.1 dB for a fluctuating one, at 90% detection and one false alarm in a millionNokia Bell Labs; Albersheim and Swerling, calculated

The upper C-band order, FCC 26-46, extended the 3.7 GHz Service to 4.14 GHz from 29 September 2026 with the same base-station limits. The drone figures outside 3GPP are for 15 GHz and above, so the n77 rows use 3GPP’s model.

Source: eCFR Title 47 as of 1 October 2026; TR 38.765 and TR 38.901; arXiv:1911.05926 and arXiv:2605.23561; releases as cited (Compiled).

One thing the table makes clear is that neither the regulator nor the noise floor is the limit. The FCC allows 82.1 dBm in 100 MHz and a 320 W radio reaches 81.1 dBm, so the licence leaves headroom to spare. The cap that binds is 3GPP’s: 37 or 52 dBm while listening, set by receiver saturation and isolation, which part 3 works through.

On noise alone a C-band macro would see a small drone kilometres away

Run on those inputs, the radar equation is generous. It gives ranges of kilometres for every target at n77 and of a kilometre or more at 28 GHz (Exhibit 3).

Exhibit 3On thermal noise alone an n77 macro sees a small drone at 1.1 to 18 km, depending on power, beam and dwell
CaseEIRPDwellSmall dronePersonCar
n77, 37 dBm, wide search beam45.0 dBm1 ms1.13 km2.2 km4.5 km
n77, 52 dBm, wide search beam60.0 dBm1 ms2.7 km5.2 km10.7 km
n77, 52 dBm, narrow beam78.1 dBm1 ms7.6 km14.6 km30.2 km
n77, 320 W, narrow beam81.1 dBm16 ms18.0 km34.9 km72.1 km
28 GHz, Nokia Bell Labs radio51.5 dBm1 ms465 m899 m1.86 km
28 GHz, 3GPP assumption, 30 dBm62.1 dBm1 ms1.41 km2.73 km5.63 km

Monostatic; n77 at 3.85 GHz and 100 MHz, 28 GHz at 400 MHz; threshold 17 dB; 3 dB implementation loss. A wide search beam transmits at element gain, 8 dBi, and receives on the full array. Range scales as the fourth root of the budget: 3 dB is a factor of 1.19, 12 dB a factor of 2.

Source: radar equation, energy form, on TR 38.765 and TR 38.901 inputs as tabled in Exhibit 2; Blue Prysm calculation (Calculated).

Two measurements give us a check on the method against the real world. In May 2026 Nokia Bell Labs reported detecting a DJI Air 3 with unmodified commercial 5G radio units at 27.6 GHz, “in over 500 meters distance in a challenging radio environment rich of strong clutter”, with a median range error of 23 cm against satellite positioning. Researchers at the University of Science and Technology of China report “a sensing range of up to 1,000 m” and a mean localisation error of 4.9 m in their BSense preprint. Their site is a 4.9 GHz Huawei 5G-Advanced base station with 128 channels and a combined OFDM and chirp waveform. Those are the only two measured single-site ranges on the record, and both fall well inside the noise-only figures.

Five constraints take 7.6 km on paper to about 1.4 km

Between 7.6 km on paper and a kilometre in the field lie five constraints that the noise budget leaves out, and each of them has a number on the record. Applied one after another, as an illustration, they bring the n77 range down to about 1.4 km before elevation is even counted (Exhibit 4).

Exhibit 4A wide search beam, a fluctuating target, one building’s clutter, transmitter leakage and the receive window take 7.6 km to 1.4 km, near the two measurements

Calculated, noise onlyCalculated, with each penalty in turnMeasured, one site

0.5 km1 km2 km5 km10 km20 km320 W, narrow beam, 16 ms dwell320 W, narrow beam, 16 ms dwell: 18.0 km18.0 km52 dBm full duplex, narrow beam, 1 ms52 dBm full duplex, narrow beam, 1 ms: 7.6 km7.6 kmthen a wide search beam, 18 dBthen a wide search beam, 18 dB: 2.7 km2.7 kmthen a fluctuating target, 4.1 dBthen a fluctuating target, 4.1 dB: 2.1 km2.1 kmthen one building of clutter, 2.9 dBthen one building of clutter, 2.9 dB: 1.8 km1.8 kmthen leaked transmitter, 1.8 dBthen leaked transmitter, 1.8 dB: 1.6 km1.6 kmthen the receive window at 30 kHzthen the receive window at 30 kHz: 1.4 km1.4 kmMeasured: Huawei site, 4.9 GHzMeasured: Huawei site, 4.9 GHz: 1.0 km1.0 kmMeasured: Nokia, 27.6 GHzMeasured: Nokia, 27.6 GHz: 0.5 km or more0.5 km or moreDetection range, logarithmic. Small drone, −12.8 dBsm (3GPP model); Air 3 about −17 dBsm.n77 at 3.85 GHz, 100 MHz, 17 dB threshold. Each step applies to the row above it.

Source: radar equation on TR 38.765 and TR 38.901 inputs, as an illustration (Calculated). Steps: transmit gain 8 dBi instead of 26.1 dBi; Swerling 1 threshold 21.1 dB instead of 17 dB; clutter as the 2.9 dB rise in the interference floor that one building causes, through transmitter intermodulation, in Nokia Bell Labs’ model of their 27.6 GHz radio; residual self-interference 5 dB above thermal, a further 1.8 dB; Nokia’s receive-window formula at 30 kHz, window unshifted. Measured: BSense on a Huawei 5G-A base station, arXiv:2603.29187, and Nokia Bell Labs, arXiv:2605.23561, both preprints (Reported).

  1. The transmitter. 3GPP capped monostatic power at 37 or 52 dBm because a receiver saturates at −28 dBm and isolation was assumed at 65 or 80 dB. Whatever leaks past the cancellation raises the noise floor. The companies in 3GPP’s evaluation modelled that leakage at 0, 5 or 10 dB above thermal noise; at 5 dB the floor rises by 3 dB and range falls by 16%. The alternative, transmitting at full power and listening afterwards, leaves the site deaf while it transmits. One 30 kHz OFDM symbol lasts about 35.7 µs, which blinds the site to everything within about 5.35 km. The rural results that met 3GPP’s objectives, all from one source, did both: 37 dBm while listening, plus 56 dBm transmissions while the receiver was off.
  2. Clutter. In Nokia’s model the echo of one building 30 m away raises the interference floor by 2.9 dB through transmitter intermodulation, and that alone takes 797 m to 675 m. The BSense team give a vivid picture of what clutter looks like at the receiver: in one frame “only a single point corresponds to the UAV, while 174 points are noise”. They averaged 168 false detections in every 640 ms frame and got that down to 0.04 only by filtering at the point, object and trajectory levels. In 3GPP’s evaluation, one single-site result with moving clutter reported false alarms of 91%.
  3. The search. A narrow beam has to be pointed somewhere, and a drone could be anywhere. A wide transmit beam covers the sky but gives up about 18 dB of gain, which divides range by 2.8. The millimetre-wave array 3GPP evaluated is analogue and has to sweep. The one result of seven that met every objective used 220 transmit beams with observations of up to 10 ms each, which is about 2.2 s to come back round to every beam.
  4. The receive window. OFDM’s cyclic prefix is about one fourteenth of a symbol. At 30 kHz spacing an echo from beyond about 357 m arrives outside it, and the unshifted receive window ends near 5.35 km. At 120 kHz the figures are 89 m and 1,338 m, which match Nokia’s own. In Nokia’s model the window takes 675 m to 540 m at 27.6 GHz; at 30 kHz it takes our n77 step-down from 1.6 km to 1.4 km.
  5. Elevation. A macro panel is built to cover the ground, and drones are not on the ground. Seen from a 25 m mast, a drone at 120 m is 43.5° up at 100 m, 17.6° at 300 m and 2.7° at 2 km. 3GPP’s evaluation offered panels with no tilt or with 12° of downtilt, whereas China Mobile advertises its sensing sites with an opening angle of at least 60°, which is a vertical pattern built for the purpose. A hovering drone is a separate problem again. Nokia’s missed detections came at radial speeds under 5 m/s, where the processing that removes static clutter removes the drone along with the buildings.

Thermal noise, in other words, is not what limits a sensing network. Five constraints, applied in turn as an illustration, take a 7.6 km noise-only range to about 1.4 km before elevation is counted. They are a wide search beam, a fluctuating target, one building’s clutter as Nokia Bell Labs modelled it, transmitter leakage 5 dB above thermal noise, and the receive window. That lands much closer to the two published measurements, 500 m and 1,000 m, than to the noise budget. The levers that move range are isolation, clutter suppression and vertical coverage. Transmit power is not one of them.

The claims above 2 km publish no conditions

Five range figures are on the record, and they are not all of the same kind: two measurements that publish their conditions, two claims that do not, and one multi-site demonstration (Exhibit 5).

Exhibit 5The two measured single-site ranges are 500 m and 1,000 m; the two claims above 2 km publish no band, power, dwell or false-alarm rate
Who and whenBand and siteRange reportedConditions published
Nokia Bell Labs, May 2026 (preprint)27.6 GHz; unmodified commercial radio units; one site500 m or more; median range error 23 cmYes: inputs, clutter model and missed detections
University of Science and Technology of China, BSense, March 2026 (preprint)4.9 GHz; Huawei 5G-Advanced base station, 128 channels; one siteUp to 1,000 m; mean localisation error 4.9 mYes: waveform, false-detection counts and filtering
China Mobile and Huawei, Shenzhen, May 20235G-A sensing base station; band not statedAbove 2 km from one site; targets as small as 0.01 m² (−20 dBsm)No: no band, power, dwell, altitude or false-alarm rate
China Mobile Shandong and ZTE, January 2024128-transceiver site; band not statedAbove 2 km from one site; 0.01 m²No
AT&T and Ericsson, AT&T Stadium, July 2026Massive MIMO radios on several existing sitesDrones tracked at 300 to 400 feet; “at least three” radios for reasonable trackingPartly: altitude and site count; no range or power

Source: arXiv:2605.23561 and arXiv:2603.29187 (preprints); National Business Daily, 27 May 2023; ZTE, 30 January 2024; Ericsson release via Placera, 10 July 2026; RCR Wireless, 4 August 2026 (Reported).

In May 2023 China Mobile and Huawei claimed that a Shenzhen 5G-A base station could sense targets of 0.01 m², or −20 dBsm, at “单站探测距离超2KM”, a single-site range of more than 2 km. China Mobile Shandong and ZTE repeated both claims in January 2024. Is that plausible? On the noise budget with a wide search beam, a −20 dBsm target is seen at 3.5 km with 52 dBm and a 16 ms dwell, and at 0.75 km with 37 dBm and 1 ms. So the claims fall inside the first case and outside the second, and since none of them publishes its conditions there is no way to tell which applies. The AT&T and Ericsson multistatic demonstration points the other way. Ericsson Federal’s chief executive told RCR Wireless that “It takes at least three for ‘reasonable tracking’”, which is exactly the conclusion 3GPP’s evaluation reached with monostatic sites. One site on its own is rarely enough.

Which uses survive

Set against the ranges, the evaluation and the measurements, the candidate uses sort themselves by how far they need to see and by what limits them first (Exhibit 6).

Exhibit 6Drone tracking in dense grids and protection of named sites survive; a rural drone layer from existing macros is marginal, and single-site detection beyond 2 km is unproven
UseRange it needsWhat limits itVerdict
Drone tracking in a dense urban grid, several sites fusedUp to about 300 to 450 m from the nearest siteClutter, false alarms, elevationSurvives; 9 of 10 and 7 of 9 sources with fusion
Point protection: stadiums, prisons, airportsA few hundred metres round a perimeterClutter; who may act on a detectionSurvives technically; the buyer is public, see part 5
People: crowd density, presenceTens to hundreds of metresPermission and privacy rather than physicsSurvives at venue scale; the Verizon trial used phone signals, not body echoes
Vehicles and trafficHundreds of metresCameras and car radar in placeSurvives technically; weak case
Millimetre-wave small-cell sensingUp to 200 m between sitesBeam revisit; 89 m prefix windowShort-range niche with 0.375 m resolution
Wide-area rural drone surveillance from existing macros1 to 2 kmFull-duplex power cap; synchronisation for bistaticMarginal; 37 dBm full duplex failed in 3GPP’s rural case
Single-site small-drone detection beyond 2 kmAbove 2 kmIsolation, false alarms, elevationUnproven; claims without published conditions
Rainfall from microwave linksn/a: attenuation, not echoesAccess to link dataProven science on existing links; needs no sensing air interface

Rainfall from link attenuation was shown by Messer, Zinevich and Alpert in Science (2006) and mapped across the Netherlands from about 2,400 links by Overeem, Leijnse and Uijlenhoet in PNAS (2013). 5GAA’s view is in part 8 of the 6G series.

Source: our reading of the ranges above, TR 38.765’s results and the measurements cited (Judgement).

The pattern is that sensing survives where the network is dense and the customer is fixed in place. A city grid with sites 500 m apart puts every drone within a few hundred metres of three sites, which is the geometry 3GPP’s evaluation passed in. A stadium or a prison is a fixed perimeter that a carrier, or a private network, can surround with sites chosen for the purpose. The use the roadmaps most often draw, a national drone-surveillance layer from existing rural macro sites, does not survive on today’s evidence. Its sites are too far apart for one to see a small drone reliably, and too loosely synchronised for several to combine, as part 3 showed. That one has to wait for the bistatic, multistatic 6G design.

The terms, briefly

  • Radar cross-section (dBsm). How large an object looks to a radar, in decibels relative to one square metre. A small drone is about −13 dBsm, a twentieth of a square metre; a car is about +11 dBsm.
  • EIRP. Effective isotropic radiated power: transmit power plus antenna gain, the figure the FCC limits.
  • Dwell. The transmit time integrated on one target; range grows with its fourth root.
  • Swerling 1. A standard model of a target whose echo fluctuates from look to look. It needs about 8 dB more signal than a steady one for the same detection probability.
  • Cyclic prefix. The guard copied onto each OFDM symbol. An echo delayed beyond it spills into the next symbol unless the receiver shifts its window.

Implications

Carrier strategist

Sell what survives: drone detection in dense grids with several sites fused, and protection of named sites with sites placed for the purpose. Before a trial, ask the vendor for three numbers: the isolation in dB at the trial power, the panel’s vertical coverage, and the false-alarm rate per hour. Those decide range far more than transmit power does, because the step from 7.6 km to 1.4 km comes from beam, clutter, leakage and window, not from watts.

Investor

Discount any range claim that leaves out band, power, dwell, altitude and false-alarm rate. The published measurements are 500 m at 27.6 GHz and 1,000 m at 4.9 GHz from one site; the claims above 2 km publish no conditions. A plan priced on national rural coverage rests on the use the evidence supports least, since 37 dBm full duplex failed 3GPP’s rural case.

Vendor

Build the roadmap on the gap between 7.6 km on paper and a kilometre in the field. It has three parts: isolation that allows full power while listening, clutter suppression that keeps hold of a hovering drone, and panels that see upwards. Then publish measured range with the conditions attached. No vendor has yet done so outside a preprint.

Method and limits

How this was built

Detection range is the monostatic radar equation in its energy form. Range to the fourth power equals transmit power times dwell time times both antenna gains times wavelength squared times radar cross-section, over (4π)3 times thermal noise density times noise figure times losses times the required signal-to-noise ratio. Bandwidth cancels out. The inputs are 3GPP’s: panels of 8 dBi elements, 64 per polarisation at n77 (3.85 GHz) and 256 at 28 GHz, giving 26.1 dBi and 32.1 dBi; noise figures of 5 and 7 dB; transmit powers of 37 and 52 dBm; and the cross-sections in TR 38.901. We assume a 3 dB implementation loss and a 17 dB threshold, which is the figure Nokia Bell Labs used. Dwell is 1 ms (a 10 ms frame with 10% given to sensing) or 16 ms (a 160 ms observation at 10%).

We checked the method against the one published measurement with a matching link budget, Nokia Bell Labs’. With their inputs it gives 797 m on noise alone. Adding the two effects their own model adds, clutter-driven intermodulation and the receive window, reproduces their 540 m, and they measured 500 m or more. Every noise-only range is therefore an upper bound. The step-down from 7.6 km is an illustration rather than a prediction; the source line of Exhibit 4 lists its five steps and the decibels each one takes. The Swerling 1 threshold is 21.1 dB at 90% detection and one false alarm in a million.

What it does not show

Nothing here models clutter in a specific city, multipath, the elevation pattern of a real panel or any particular vendor’s processing. The step-down borrows its clutter penalty from one urban site at 27.6 GHz and should be read as an illustration of scale, not a prediction. The 3GPP cross-sections are frequency-independent models, and the measured drone cross-sections we opened are for 15 GHz and above. The two measurements are preprints. The Chinese range claims publish no conditions at all.

Data as of: 3GPP reports, eCFR as of 1 Oct 2026, preprints and releases as read 7 Oct 2026 · Method version 1.0.

Found an error? Tell us. Corrections are published on the piece that carried them.

Next in the seriesWho pays for sensing, and who mayWho is paying for network sensing, and who is allowed to sell it?